China's Growing Sharp Power: Western, Asian, and African Perspectives

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8:30 AM – 5:30 PM
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China's Growing Sharp Power

Conference Participants

Lina BENABDALLAH, Wake Forest University
Anne-Marie BRADY, University of Canterbury
See-Won BYUN, San Francisco State University
Larry DIAMOND, Stanford University
Mathieu DUCHATEL, Institut Montague
Paul EVANS, University of British Columbia
Mariane FERME, UC Berkeley
Martin HALA, Charles University
Kwei-Bo HUANG, National Chengchi University
Ching Kwan LEE, University of California, LA
Yawei LIU, Carter Center
Tanvi MADAN, The Brookings Institution
Andrew MERTHA, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Jamie MONSON, Michigan State University
W. Gyude MOORE, Center for Global Development
Kevin O’BRIEN, UC Berkeley
John POMFRET, Former Washington Post Bureau Chief
Orville SCHELL, Asia Society
Yoshihide SOEYA, Keio University
China's Growing Sharp Power

**Agenda**

8:30 AM – 9:00 AM
Doors Open and Participant Registration

9:00 AM – 9:10 AM
Welcome and Opening Remarks

Kevin O’BRIEN, UC Berkeley

9:10 AM – 10:40 AM
Panel 1: Western Country Perspectives

Moderator: Larry DIAMOND, Stanford University

Canada: Paul EVANS, University of British Columbia
Czech Republic: Martin HALA, Charles University/AcaMedia
Europe/France: Mathieu DUCHATEL, Institut Montaigne
New Zealand: Anne-Marie BRADY, University of Canterbury
United States: Larry DIAMOND, Stanford University

10:40 AM – 11:00 AM
Break

11:00 AM – 12:30 PM
Panel 2: Asian Country Perspectives

Moderator: Kevin O’BRIEN, UC Berkeley

Southeast Asia: Andrew MERTHA, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Japan: Yoshihide SOEYA, Keio University
Korea: See-Won BYUN, San Francisco State University
South Asia: Tanvi MADAN, The Brookings Institution
Taiwan: Kwei-Bo HUANG, National Chengchi University

12:45 PM – 1:45 PM
Lunch Break

2:00 PM – 3:30 PM
Panel 3: African Country Perspectives

Moderator: Mariane FERME, UC Berkeley

Historical Context: Jamie MONSON, Michigan State University
Human Capital Investments: Lina BENABDALLAH, Wake Forest University
Sub-Saharan Africa: W. Gyude MOORE, Center for Global Development
Zambia: Ching Kwan LEE, UCLA

3:30 PM – 3:45 PM
Break
China's Growing Sharp Power

Participant Abstracts

Lina BENABDALLAH, Wake Forest University

An important part of China’s Africa policy revolves around Chinese investments in human capital development and professionalization trainings for African journalists, elites, public servants, and security personnel. Although, often under-explored, human capital investments are increasingly central to China-Africa relations and FOCAC agenda. This presentation unpacks Chinese-sponsored professionalization training programs and examines their impacts and perceptions among African recipients. An important impact that will be explored is the networking opportunities and people-to-people relations that are fostered through these trainings.

Anne-Marie BRADY, University of Canterbury

New Zealand—along with other nations—is being targeted by a concerted political interference campaign by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The CCP’s political interference strategy aims to gain support for the CCP government’s political and economic agendas by co-opting political and economic elites. It also seeks to access strategic information and resources. China’s efforts have undermined the integrity of the New Zealand political system, threaten New Zealand sovereignty, and affect the rights of Chinese New Zealanders to
freedom of speech, association, and religion. The New Zealand government’s reluctance to publicly address the problem has had a negative impact on New Zealand’s reputation as one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Yet nearly two years since the issue was first made public in New Zealand, a public debate is now underway, that is putting pressure on the New Zealand government to face up to the problem. As a trade dependent small state struggling to maintain an independent foreign policy, New Zealand’s experience of addressing the problem of foreign political interference activities by trying to “dive into the water without making a splash” is a useful model for other small states to consider.

See-Won BYUN, San Francisco State University

China’s sharp power activities underscore the political implications of China’s rising economic leverage. The South Korean experience points to the limitations of Chinese sharp power in managing relations with Asian trade partners. First, the growing asymmetry of economic interdependence reinforces South Korean mistrust stemming from a deep historical legacy of hierarchical relations. Second, Beijing’s reliance on economic tools of political influence fuels suspicion over its broader interference in South Korean strategic decisions, most importantly on the US-South Korea alliance. China’s restrictions on Korean businesses, tourism, and culture in response to the THAAD dispute in 2016-2017 amplified these concerns. Although Seoul agreed to lay aside the issue in favor of the economic partnership, China’s actions left a lasting dent on South Korean preferences and perceptions. The dispute prompted South Korean businesses to rethink their dependence on Chinese markets, and drove public opinion to the worst levels since a 2003 dispute over historical issues. South Korea’s diplomatic and cultural exchanges with China have increased in quantity but not quality, especially since the mid-2000s, when South Korean trade grew more dependent on China than on the United States. But despite their counterproductive effects, China’s current sharp power activities do not directly attack democratic processes, reflecting primarily internal security concerns rather than expansionist ambitions abroad. China’s slowing growth in particular requires Beijing to seek alternative sources of domestic and international legitimacy, including cultural and political appeal as a global player.

Larry DIAMOND, Stanford University

China's projection of sharp power in the United States does not yet approach the extent of its inappropriate influence in New Zealand and Australia, but there are growing signs of the PRC's inappropriate influence efforts in many sectors of American life--including universities, think tanks, the Chinese-language news media, the Chinese American community, and the technology sector, which has been subjected to rampant theft and misappropriation of intellectual property. Some of what the PRC is doing to influence democracies falls into the legitimate category of soft power, in that it represents open efforts to engage and persuade American other audiences. But much of it is illegitimate sharp power, in that it is, to quote former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, "covert, coercive, or corrupting" (or all three). When Beijing deploys its vast architecture of covert influence operations, through the
United Front Work Department and other party and state agencies, to control the narrative about China, silence protest and dissent (or even questioning) by Chinese nationals or Chinese Americans, preempt unfriendly questioning or research by think tanks, punish critics with visa denials or closed access in China, and coerce American corporations into accepting Beijing's line (for example, on the status of Taiwan), this is not "soft power", it is an unacceptable constraint on freedom and democracy in the United States. Civil society institutions and governmental agencies in the U.S. must push back by educating themselves about the methods that the Chinese Communist party-state is using to compromise freedom and independent inquiry in the U.S. And they must promote greater transparency, institutional integrity, and reciprocity in their ties with peer actors and official institutions in China.

**Mathieu DUCHATEL, Institut Montaigne**

This presentation will contrast the situation in France with the situation in the EU headquarters in Brussels, asking why France so far seems to have been less targeted by Chinese sharp power measures than the EU. There is no doubt that we can piece together a list of anecdotal evidence of Chinese sharp power action in Brussels and in France, that overall show a pattern of growing influence and increased resources devoted to shape favorable views of China. But France is not an easy field for China to operate, despite the presence of a community of around 600,000 overseas Chinese, mostly located around Paris. A number of questions arise from the factual list of China’s sharp power activities in Western Europe. What is the connection between China’s broader political goals in relations with France and the EU and to what extent are they served by active sharp power actions? Is China practicing self-restraint in France, is there a lack of interest in shaping the foreign policy decisions of the French democracy or is there satisfaction in China with the state of affairs and the strength of its networks in Paris? What are the factors that constrain the exercise of sharp power by China?

**Paul EVANS, University of British Columbia**

China's growing presence inside Canada has generated increasing governmental and public attention to its instruments of influence and interference, though at levels considerably lower than in Australia and the United States. The matter of greatest concern in Ottawa is Chinese acquisitions and investments especially in frontier technologies. The arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wang has set in train a series of events that has made this the most turbulent moment in Canada-China relations since Tiananmen Square and put Canada squarely in the vortex of a techno-nationalist clash between the US and China. The impact on public and media sentiment has been substantial and coincided with growing media concern about influence, interference and intimidation activities inside Canada. The policy debate is still in an early stage. On the one side, there are concerns about specific cases of improper Chinese influence, in part based on domestic incidents and in part on instructive examples and government statements from Australia and the US. On the other side are (a) worries about an overreaction that singularizes China, sensationalizes the issues and stigmatizes Canadians of Chinese descent and (b)
arguments that the existing legal framework, the capabilities of intelligence, police and security agencies, and antidotes built into the multi-layered structure of Chinese communities across the country are sufficient to manage the threat.

**Martin HALA, Charles University and AcaMedia**

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) went the opposite way from the PRC thirty years ago in 1989, but in the last decade after 2008, there has been a remarkable reorientation towards China, institutionalized in the “16+1” grouping in 2012. The Czech Republic, in particular, underwent in the last five years since 2014 perhaps the most dramatic u-turn from a value-based foreign policy towards the current “pragmatic” relationship with the PRC. The professed pragmatism underpins the “economic diplomacy” driving the rapprochement. The concept emphasizes economic opportunity, mostly Chinese investment, and downplays political ramifications. Yet in reality, the policy’s economic impact proved minimal; the net result has been almost entirely political. Blurring of the line between politics and economics is perhaps best illustrated by the notorious Chinese company CEFC that dominated the bilateral relationship since 2015 until it collapsed last year. The company hailed as the “flagship of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic” brought little investment, but managed to capture much of the local political elite, often through direct employment. As the recent CEFC conviction for political corruption in the UN and Africa has demonstrated, elite capture through strategic corruption by a nominally private company has not been limited to the Czech Republic or CEE, but appears to represent a larger trend in, if not the substance of, the PRC’s “economic diplomacy.”

**Kwei-Bo HUANG, National Chengchi University**

The so-called concept of “sharp power” can be viewed in a sense as a PRC government-organized united front effort and intervention in an external actor, both to marshal the maximum potential support from it, including the governments and people, and to counter or lessen US hegemony, or any major competitor on the regional or global stage. The PRC’s use of “sharp power” towards the ROC (Taiwan) concentrates on persuasion, attraction, confusion, and manipulation. In Taiwan, there exist credible and distorted explanations of the PRC’s policy behavior towards the pursuit of cross-Strait connections and towards the practical need to shape, change, or promote Taiwanese audience’s views about issues critical or sensitive to the PRC. It’s very likely that the loss of the Taiwan people’s confidence in cross-Strait competitions and the degree of the PRC’s “sharp power” are positively correlated. Yet, as a Western proverb puts it, “handsome is as handsome does.” So long as the way the Chinese Communist Party rules rapidly developing mainland China doesn’t correspond to such selfclaimed principles as “democracy,” “equality,” and “reciprocity” in its Taiwan policy – occasionally with a demonstration of arrogance or negligence instead, the doubt or criticism that the PRC is exercising “sharp power” will always remain.
Debates about global China often conflate Beijing’s grand strategies and ambitions with their actual effects, mechanisms and limitations on the ground. Drawing on my study of Chinese state investment in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa, this presentation highlights the local foundations of global China’s uneven influence. It provides a counterpoint to the claim (in the Hoover Institution report) that China’s sharp power is “coercive, corrupting and covert.” The latter argument ignores that Chinese power, sharp or not, is also collaborative and contentious, i.e. Chinese power is also constituted, contained and channeled by local interests, ideologies and politics.

There essentially no difference between soft power and sharp power. Both are exercised by nations to advance national interests that cannot be achieved via force, economic prowess, or political pressure. This presentation will offer a brief history of the soft/sharp power interaction between the United States and China, as well as thoughts on the similarities and differences of the approaches adopted by the two countries in influencing the other nation through their respective soft/sharp power campaigns. The speaker will also offer his thoughts on how to respond to China’s seemingly more aggressive approach.
This is not only true in the case of national-level ministries (such as rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce), but also in terms of the imperfect fit between national goals and the specific interests of various interested parties, whether bureaucracies, state-owned enterprises, or funding sources. This limits Beijing’s capacity to implement effectively its overseas programs. Second, Center-local relations have been a perennial dynamic in domestic Chinese politics. Chinese domestic governing apparatus is extremely decentralized. Much of the capital within the realm of domestic Chinese politics is expended on keeping errant localities in line. Given that three-quarters of Chinese FDI originates from sub-national political and economic units, we see the struggle between Beijing and its sub-national governments play out on the international stage. The case of Myanmar demonstrates these dynamics. Third, Xi Jinping’s attempts to recentralize the state and inject an ever-increasing role for the Chinese Communist Party (and the military) in foreign policy decision-making has the potential to offset some of these traditional weaknesses of the state, even while the potential exists for simply adding another layer to an already unwieldy bureaucratic apparatus. These efforts can contribute to areas of stability and asymmetrical influence in China’s overseas investments, as has been the case in Laos and Cambodia. Finally, exogenous factors have alternatively exacerbated and mitigated these tendencies. On the one hand, inconsistent US policies and unforced errors in the region have the effect of enhancing Chinese influence. On the other hand, the domestic political situations in these host countries - in the three cases above, as well as more recently in Malaysia - have all affected China’s prospects for success in different ways and are a key to understanding and anticipating outcomes.

**Jamie MONSON, Michigan State University**

The United States was concerned about Chinese investment in infrastructure in Africa. They accused China of extending the “great steel arm of China” deep into the African interior. To counteract Chinese influence, the Americans built a rival infrastructure project alongside the Chinese one. Chinese aid and investment, the US cautioned, was ideological and state dominated. American investment, on the other hand, respected the freedom of the market. This all happened in the 1960s, yet the resemblance with today’s context is striking. What can we learn from this history – and how have things changed? What is so “Chinese” about Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa, then and now, and why does that matter?

**W. Gyude MOORE, Center for Global Development**

Despite its substantial natural endowment, Africa still lags behind the rest of the world as a destination for Foreign Direct Investment. Its mineral endowment alone is inadequate to improve Africa’s attractiveness for investment. High on the list of factors undermining the continent is its low stock of public capital – roads, rail, electricity, ports. Africa’s position as the geographic region with the lowest coverage of infrastructure in every sector forces private investors to underwrite public goods. This reduces returns on investment and functionally imposes a tax. Regulatory uncertainty, and low human capital compound the problem. Yet Africa is in dire need of private
investment to create jobs, expand its tax base, and improve the quality of life of its people. Faced with a future of a rising population, slow job growth, and adverse impact of Climate Change on agriculture (where over 50% of the population find employment), the strategy adopted by Multilateral Development Banks to finance African infrastructure is inadequate and misplaced. The rise of non-traditional, non-Paris Club lenders has provided a welcome alternative to raise money to finance African infrastructure. But this option is fraught with risks since these new lenders do not adhere to Paris Club debt sustainability rules, making debt restructuring negotiations unpredictable and problematic. How does the average African country navigate the nexus of financing public capital goods, managing debt flow and stock amid fluctuating commodities prices and still fund social public goods?

Shelley RIGGER, Davidson College

China’s sharp power program is nowhere more ambitious, evident, or dangerous than in Taiwan. The PRC views Taiwan differently from other states; it considers the island part of its rightful territory and it sees bringing Taiwan to heel as a core national interest. Beijing repeatedly and pointedly declines to eschew using military force to achieve its goals. Given that military force is on the table, it’s not surprising that there seem to be few restraints on Beijing’s use of sharp power to pressure Taiwan. We know the PRC has manipulated social media to influence elections and has supported divisive organizations, some with links to organized crime. It also has attempted to use the leverage cross-Strait economic interactions give it over Taiwan’s business community to turn Taiwan’s policies in its favor. At the same time, however, Taiwanese are uniquely aware of the threat of Chinese pressure. Unlike citizens in other countries, who may be surprised or even skeptical about that threat, Taiwanese know that China is using sharp power against them. This awareness may provide some protection against sharp power efforts; at a minimum, knowing what Taiwanese are doing about sharp power can help other nations prepare and respond when the sharp power weapons are used against them.

Yoshihide SOEYA, Keio University

Japanese views toward China used to be very positive, with “favorable” views constantly recording 70 to 80 percent of the respondents in public opinion polls until the end of the 1980s. Against this backdrop, the Chinese Communist Party attempted, somewhat successfully, to intervene in Japanese domestic politics through formal and informal channels to leftist political forces and public opinion in the 1950s and the 1960s. After diplomatic normalization in 1972, Tokyo made explicit efforts to establish good relations with both the United States and China, when the Chinese government did not feel much incentive to use “sharp power” (the concept of course was not existent at the time). Since the mid-1990s, however, Japanese views toward China have gradually turned negative, and have become entirely “unfavorable” after 2005 with around 80 percent of the respondents saying so in public opinion polls. In sharp contrast to some other countries in the region, therefore, the Japanese society, let alone politics, is now quite resilient against Chinese “sharp power.” Educational institutions that have established Confucius Institutes, for instance, were very limited to begin with. This may not mean
that China has given up its attempt entirely, but it is unlikely to be more penetrating than traditional public diplomacy.

**China's Growing Sharp Power**

### Participant Biographies

**Lina BENABDALLAH, Wake Forest University**

Lina Benabdallah is Assistant Professor at Wake Forest University. She is also a CARI-affiliate research associate. Her research interests are centered on China’s foreign policy in Africa with a specific interest in security and military relations. Her current book manuscript examines China’s multilateral foreign policy in continental Africa and seeks to theorize the power dynamics within these relations. Other publications include a co-authored book chapter with Dan Large in *New Directions in the Study of Africa and China* (Routledge, 2018) and a recent article titled “Contesting the international order by integrating it: the case of China’s Belt and Road initiative” which appeared in the *Third World Quarterly*.

**Anne-Marie BRADY, University of Canterbury**

Anne-Marie researches Chinese domestic and foreign politics and polar politics. She is editor-in-chief of The Polar Journal, and has published ten books and more than forty scholarly papers on a range of issues including China’s strategic interests in the Arctic and Antarctic, China’s modernised propaganda system, New Zealand-China relations, NZ foreign policy and competing foreign policy interests in Antarctica. She is a fluent Mandarin speaker with dual majors in Chinese, Political
Science and International Relations. At Auckland University she studied with John Minford and at Australian National University her doctoral supervisors were Geremie R. Barmé and W.J.F Jenner. All three instilled in her an acute ear for the political use of language and a deep respect for primary sources. Anne-Marie is a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, and a member of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. In 2014 she was appointed to a two-year term on the World Economic Forum's Global Action Council on the Arctic. Her recent publications include: Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), China's Thought Management (Routledge, 2012), The Emerging Politics of Antarctica (Routledge, 2013) and China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press and Wilson Press, 2017)

See-Won BYUN, San Francisco State University

See-Won Byun’s research and teaching focus on the politics of China, international relations of East Asia, and international relations theory. Her research examines China’s political economy and global integration, interdependence and security in Asia, and national identity politics in Asian relations. Before joining SF State, she was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Bates College. She received a PhD in political science and MA in international affairs from The George Washington University, MA in international studies from Yonsei University, and BA in economics from Brown University.

Larry DIAMOND, Stanford University

Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. For more than six years, he directed FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, where he now leads its Program on Arab Reform and Democracy and its Global Digital Policy Incubator. He is the founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and also serves as Senior Consultant at the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends and conditions around in the world, and on policies and reforms to defend and advance democracy. His 2016 book, In Search of Democracy, explores the challenges confronting democracy and democracy promotion, gathering together three decades of his writing and research, particularly on Africa and Asia. He has just completed a new book on the global crisis of democracy, which will be published in 2019, and is now writing a textbook on democratic development.

Mathieu DUCHATEL, Institut Montaigne

Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel joined Institut Montaigne as Director of the Asia Program in January 2019. He works on China’s foreign and security policy and Northeast Asian affairs, with an interest in maritime issues, the Korean peninsula, Europe-China relations and Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Before joining Institut Montaigne he was Senior Policy Fellow and
Deputy Director of the Asia and China Programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations (2015-2018), Senior Researcher and the Representative in Beijing of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011-2015), Research Fellow with Asia Centre in Paris (2007-2011) and Associate Researcher based in Taipei with Asia Centre (2004-2007). He holds a Ph.D in political science from the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris). He has spent a total of nine years in Shanghai (Fudan University), Taipei (National Chengchi University) and Beijing and has been a visiting scholar at the School of International Studies of Peking University in 2011/2012 and the Japan Institute of International Affairs in 2015. His latest co-authored book, China’s Strong Arm, Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad was published in the Adelphi collection by IISS and Routledge in 2015.

Paul EVANS, University of British Columbia

Paul Evans teaches Asian and trans-Pacific affairs at the University of British Columbia. He earlier taught at York University and has had visiting appointments at Harvard, the University of Hong Kong and Singapore Management University. He directed the Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies in Toronto, the Institute of Asian Research and the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC, and from 2005-08 was seconded to serve as the Co-CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. He was a co-founder of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, and the Canada-Korea Forum. His most recent book is Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Trudeau to Harper. A frequent adviser and commentator on Canadian policy in Asia, he is and now working on a second installment of his 1988 biography of John Fairbank looking at Fairbank's contemporary significance in an era of downturn in US-China relations.

Mariane FERME, UC Berkeley

Mariane C. Ferme is Professor of Sociocultural Anthropology and Curator of African Ethnology for Hearst Museum of Anthropology at UC Berkeley. She received her PhD in Anthropology from the University of Chicago, after studying Political Science at the University of Milano, Italy, and majoring in anthropology at Wellesley College. Her research has long focused on Sierra Leone, and West Africa more generally. It encompasses gendered approaches to everyday practices and materiality in agrarian West African societies, and work on the political imagination in times of violence, particularly in relation to the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone. She has also done research on the ways in which international humanitarian legal institutions and jurisprudence shape that status in our collective imaginaries of figures of victimhood, criminality, and witnessing in times of war. The empirical focus of this work has been the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the developing jurisprudence in that setting about the forced conscription of child soldiers and the crime of “forced marriage.”
**Martin HALA, Charles University and AcaMedia**

Martin Hála is a sinologist currently based in Prague. Educated in Prague, Shanghai, Berkley, and at Harvard, he has taught at universities in Prague and Bratislava, and conducted research in China, Taiwan, and the U.S. He has worked for several media-assistance organizations in Europe and Asia, and from 2014-2015 served as the Asia Pacific regional manager at the Open Society Foundations. At present, he is the Director of AcaMedia Institute, and its flagship project Sinopsis.cz.

**Kwei-Bo HUANG, National Chengchi University**

Kwei-Bo Huang is currently Vice Dean in the College of International Affairs at National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (R.O.C.), as well as an associate professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Master's Program in International Studies (IMPIS) at NCCU. Among his various government and community service experiences, he is Secretary-General of the Taiwan-based Association of Foreign Relations (AFR); and he served as Chairperson of the Research & Planning Committee at R.O.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs from February 2009 to January 2011, and Vice President of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. He was also a Fulbrighter at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University in 2008, and a visiting fellow at Brookings Institution in 2012. Huang specializes in American foreign policy toward East Asia, ASEAN security affairs, conflict management and international negotiation, and public diplomacy. He earned his master’s degree from Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and his doctorate from Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland, College Park.

**Ching Kwan LEE, University of California, LA**


**Yawei LIU, Carter Center**

Yawei Liu (刘亚亚) joined The Carter Center in 1998 and has been the director of its China Program since 2005. He is the member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the associate director of the China Research Center in Atlanta, and an
adjunct professor of Political Science at Emory University. He co-authored *Obama: The Man Who Will Change America* (Chinese language, 2008). He is the founding editor of www.chinaelections.org, which was launched in 2002. Other websites founded by Dr. Liu include www.uscnpm.org and www.uscnpm.com. Since 2012, Dr. Liu has organized an annual forum on U.S.-China relations. Dr. Liu earned his B.A in English Literature from Xian Foreign Languages Institute (1982), an M.A. in modern Chinese History from the University of Hawaii (1989), and a Ph. D. in American History from Emory University (1996).

**Tanvi MADAN, The Brookings Institution**

Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and director of The India Project. Madan’s work explores Indian foreign policy, focusing in particular on India’s relations with China and the United States. She also researches the intersection between Indian energy policies and its foreign and security policies. Madan’s book *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War* will be published later this year. She is currently completing a monograph on India’s foreign policy diversification strategy. Previously she was a Harrington doctoral fellow and teaching assistant at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has also previously been a research analyst at the Brookings Institution, and worked in the information technology industry. In addition to a doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin, Madan has a master's in international relations from Yale University and a bachelor's with honors in history from Lady Shri Ram College, New Delhi, India.

**Andrew MERTHA, Johns Hopkins SAIS**

Andrew Mertha is the George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies, Director of the China Program, and Director of SAIS China at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is formerly a professor of Government at Cornell University and an assistant professor of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis. He specializes in Chinese bureaucratic politics, political institutions, and the domestic and foreign policy process. More recently, he has extended his research interests to include Cambodia. Mertha has written three books, *The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China* (Cornell University Press, 2005), *China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change* (Cornell University Press, 2008), and *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (Cornell University Press, 2014). He has provided public testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, briefed the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and has accompanied a US congressional staff delegation to Beijing, Xinjiang, and Shanghai to discuss issues of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Mertha is on the Editorial Committee for the Journal of Comparative Politics, The China Quarterly, and Asian Survey. Mertha is vice president of the Center for Khmer Studies (CKS), a member of the National Committee on US-China Relations, and an alumnus of the NCUSCR Public Intellectuals Program, 2008-
2010. He received his PhD from the University of Michigan and is originally from New York City.

Jamie MONSON, Michigan State University

Jamie Monson is Director of the African Studies Center and Professor of History at Michigan State University. A recognized researcher and scholar, Monson’s efforts have established her as a pioneer in China-Africa development studies. Her book, *Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*, explores the TAZARA railway, which was built with Chinese development aid in the 1970s. Monson’s most recent project is a forthcoming book titled *Looking East: Africa’s Historical Engagement with China*. She is also creating a documentary film based on life histories of TAZARA railway workers in Tanzania, Zambia and China. Monson serves as chairman of the Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network and is currently heading a new global initiative, “Building Trans-regional Connections Among Africa, Asia and Latin America,” that seeks to establish new scholarly paradigms for international studies.

W. Gyude MOORE, Center for Global Development

W. Gyude Moore is a visiting fellow at the Center for Global Development. He previously served as Liberia’s Minister of Public Works with oversight over the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure from December 2014 to January 2018. Prior to that role, Moore served as Deputy Chief of Staff to President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Head of the President’s Delivery Unit (PDU). As Head of the PDU, his team monitored progress and drove delivery of the Public Sector Investment Program of Liberia—a program of over $1 billion in road, power, port infrastructure, and social programs in Liberia after the civil war. As one of the President’s trusted advisors, he also played a crucial role in supporting President Sirleaf as Liberia responded to the West Africa Ebola outbreak and shaped its post-Ebola outlook. At CGD, Moore’s research focus is around financing infrastructure in Africa and the changing landscape of development finance on the continent. His research tracks the channels of private sources of finance, the rise of China and its expanding role in Africa, and Africa’s response to these changes. He currently serves on the Board of Advisors of the Master of Science in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University. He holds a BS in Political Science from Berea College and an MS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

Kevin O’BRIEN, UC Berkeley

Kevin O’Brien is the Alann P. Bedford Professor of Asian Studies and Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley. He is also the Director of Berkeley's Institute of East Asian Studies and the Walter and Elise Haas Professor of Asian Studies. He received a B.A. from Grinnell College and a Ph.D from Yale University, and taught at Ohio State before moving to Berkeley in 2000. His research focuses on contemporary Chinese politics. Among his publications are *Reform Without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change*, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China* (with Lianjiang Li), *Engaging the Law in China*: State,
Pomfret speaks, reads and writes Mandarin, having spent two years at Nanjing University in the early 1980s as part of one of the first groups of American students to study in China. He has been a bartender in Paris and practiced Judo in Japan.

**Orville SCHELL, Asia Society**

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