Seminar 208, Microeconomic Theory: The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

Seminar | February 25 | 4:10-5:30 p.m. |  Evans Hall

 Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

 Department of Economics

To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred accep-tance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We showthat this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. Weidentify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms ofboth efficiency and fairness. We show that these mechanisms perform much better byadopting a large market approach and by using a rich dataset on teachers’ applicationsin France. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more thandoubles under our mechanism.

 wqiu03@berkeley.edu