Special Event | October 12 | 12-1 p.m. | 205 South Hall
David Dill, Stanford University
Weâve known for decades that computerized vote-counting equipment is highly vulnerable to attack by people who want to affect the outcome of an election. This possibility has been made more concrete by the election of 2016, where there were widespread cyber-attacks against voter registration systems and intrusion into servers at local election offices. All of the factors are in place for effective and potentially undetected electronic tampering with election outcomes in the U.S. Fortunately, effective defenses are not particularly difficult or expensive â if, as a nation, we can find the will to get the job done. In this talk, Professor David Dill will describe the problem and the solution.
A light lunch is included for attendees who RSVP in advance.
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