Dissertation talk: Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship
Presentation | September 28 | 1:30-2:30 p.m. | 373 Soda Hall
Research on the circumvention of Internet censorship requires modeling the behavior of censors. Circumvention systems are designed according to assumptions arising from models: the more accurate the models, the more effective the circumvention. A circumvention system designed under inadequate assumptions risks irrelevance, through being easily blockable or impractical to deploy.
I will present observations on the behavior of real-world censors, and on circumvention systems (already deployed or under development) that take advantage of their weaknesses. Censorship is not only a technical phenomenon but also a social and economic one: censors should be understood not only as a set of capabilities, but also as entities subject to various influences and limitations. This work aims at a richer understanding of the problem of censorship, leading to better circumvention.